The Abet bulletin board is allergic to my posts, so I'm pretending that they can hear me here:
On 8/13/08, Pastor Greg wrote,
On 8/13/08, Pastor Greg wrote,
Let's tackle this one a bit, just for a refresher: I am reading an old book on Sovereignty, by Arthur Pink, 1914.
He writes:
"To argue that God is 'trying His best' to save all mankind, but that the majority of men will not let Him save them, is to insist that the will of the Creator is impotent, and that the will of the creature is omnipotent. To throw the blame, as many do, upon the Devil, does not remove the difficulty, for if Satan is defeating the purpose of God, then, Satan is Almighty and God is no longer the Supreme Being." —Sovereignty Of God, The
I agree with him there, but here is what I would say: God, in His sovereignty, does not /insist/ that his will be done though he could. Over all, God /does/ insist that his will be done. His purposes /shall/ come to their ends, taking into account the rebellion of man and devil. But part of His divine plan is to allow man and the devil to have their own way in regard to the outcome of their personal destinies though not to the extent that it can effect any defeat to His overall purpose.
Does my statement contradict the Doctrine of God's Sovereignty?
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Here is my response:
Greg, check out the Wikipedia article on "Molinism." It's really pretty good. Molinism offers a "middle way" that preserves both divine sovereignty and robust human freedom (aka "libertarianism.") Steve and I both agree with William Lane Craig (and it would seem, Dan Whitmarsh!) that God's omniscience includes knowledge of necessary truths, contingent truths, and "middle knowledge," or knoweldge of counterfactuals.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molinism
God's Types of Knowledge
Taking after Luis de Molina, Molinists divide God's knowledge into three separate categories. The first is God's knowledge of necessary truths. These truths are independent of God's will and have no possibility to be false. Examples include statements like, "All bachelors are unmarried" or "X cannot be A and non-A at the same time, in the same way, at the same place".
[Beth's note: Of course, the above assumes the principle of non-contradiction, but it is important to understand that for Christian Molinists principle of non-contradiction reflects something about God's nature, not that God's nature is subservient to the principle of non-contradiction. C.S. Lewis has a great quote on this topic:
"God's omnipotence means [His] power to do all that is not
intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to Him,
but not nonsense. This is no limit to His power. If you choose
to say, "God can give a creature free will and at the same time
withhold free will from it", you have not succeeded in saying
anything about God: meaningless combinations of words do not
suddenly acquire meaning simply because we prefix to them the
two other words "God can." It remains true that all things are
possible with God: the intrinsic impossibilities are not things
but nonentities. It is no more possible for God than for the
weakest of His creatures to carry out both of two mutually
exclusive alternatives -- not because His power meets an
obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we
talk it about God.
... C. S. Lewis (1898-1963), The Problem of Pain
I take it that in this discussion we are talking about the Biblical God, not Homer Simpson's Jesus who "could microwave a burrito so hot that he himself could not eat it!" See http://www.simpsoncrazy.com/scripts/weekend-at-burnsies.php ]
The third kind of knowledge is God's free knowledge. This type of knowledge consists of contingent truths that are dependent upon God's will; or truths that God brings about, that He does not have to bring about. Examples might include statements like "God created the earth" or something particular about this world which God has actualized.
The second kind of knowledge is middle knowledge (or scientia media) and describes things that are contingently true, but are independent of God's will. These are truths that do not have to be true, but are true without God being the primary cause of them. "If I had taken the train instead of driving, I would not have been late for work," is an example of middle knowledge. I did not take the train, so God is not involved as a cause. The train being the better option is not a logical necessity, so it is contingent if true.
Molinists support their case with Jesus's statement in Matthew 11:23:
"And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? You will be brought down to Hades. For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day."
The Molinist claims that in this example, God will know what is contingently true and independent of God's free will, namely that the Sodomites would have responded in such a way that Sodom would still have been in existence in Jesus' day. This would be an example of a counterfactual statement.
Matthew 11:23 contains what is commonly called a counterfactual of creaturely freedom. But counterfactuals are to be distinguished from foreknowledge. The Bible contains many examples of foreknowledge or prophecy such as Deut 31:16-17 where God tells Moses that the Israelites will forsake God after they are delivered from Egypt.[1] But counterfactuals of creaturely freedom and foreknowledge are generally considered to be two separate things.[2]
Some opponents of Molinism claim that God's foreknowledge and knowledge of counterfactuals are examples of what God is going to actively bring about. That is, when Christ describes the response of the Sodomites in the aforementioned example, God was going to actively bring it about that they would remain until today.[3] Molinists have responded to this objection by noting that scripture contains examples of God's foreknowledge of evil acts. For example, the Israelites forsaking God, or Peter's denial of Christ, are both examples of what one would call overt acts of sin. Yet, according to opponents of Molinism, God is actively bringing about these overt acts of sin. This is obviously fallacious according to the Molinist. In order for this account of prophecy to be valid all prophecies must be wholly good, and never contain evil acts; but this is not the case.
A counterfactual is a statement of the form "if it were the case that P, it would be the case that Q". An example would be, "If Bob were in situation X he would freely choose A over B." The Molinist claims that even if Bob is never in situation X God could still know what Bob would do. The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all possible worlds and then actualized a particular one. God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals would play an integral part in this "choosing" of a particular world.
Molinists say the logical ordering of events for creation would be as follows:
1. God's knowledge of necessary truths.
2. God's middle knowledge, (including counterfactuals).
---Creation of the World---
3. God's free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world).
Hence, God's middle knowledge plays an important role in the actualization of the world. In fact, it seems as if God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals plays a more immediate role in creation than God's foreknowledge. The placing of God's middle knowledge between God's knowledge of necessary truths and God's creative decree is crucial. For if God's middle knowledge was after His decree of creation, then God would be actively causing what various creatures would do in various circumstances and thereby destroying libertarian freedom. But by placing middle knowledge (and thereby counterfactuals) before the creation decree God allows for freedom in the libertarian sense. The placing of middle knowledge logically after necessary truths, but before the creation decree also gives God the possibility to survey possible worlds and decide which world to actualize.[4]
Calvinists typically deny that God has "middle Knowledge," or knowledge of counterfactuals. (Unless one is a "Calvinist" like Alvin Plantinga!) Molinism allows possible worlds where human will is causal, and then this actual world-- that possible world which God wills to actually exist. It's premodern both-and thinking at its finest.
Pink rejects that there are counterfactuals and such "possible worlds:" there must either be an actual world where God's will is sovereign, or an actual world where human will is sovereign.
"To argue that God is "trying His best" to save all mankind, but that the majority of men will not let Him save them, is to insist that the will of the Creator is impotent, and that the will of the creature is omnipotent." (Pink)
This is quintessential modernist either-or thinking. To my mind, it is admirable that Pink wants to glorify God by stressing His sovereignty; but his god is a lesser being than One Whose omniscience is even greater. Or, to put it another way, which God is greater?
1) One whose knowledge includes only (a) necessary and (b) contingent truths
2) One whose knowledge includes (a) necessary, (b) contingent and (c) counterfactual truths?
Bottom line: for those of us who are Molinists, the Calvinist God is just too small! Calvinism, instead of glorifying God, diminishes his omniscience, thus causing His sovereignty to suffer as well.
[Beth's note: Of course, the above assumes the principle of non-contradiction, but it is important to understand that for Christian Molinists principle of non-contradiction reflects something about God's nature, not that God's nature is subservient to the principle of non-contradiction. C.S. Lewis has a great quote on this topic:
"God's omnipotence means [His] power to do all that is not
intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to Him,
but not nonsense. This is no limit to His power. If you choose
to say, "God can give a creature free will and at the same time
withhold free will from it", you have not succeeded in saying
anything about God: meaningless combinations of words do not
suddenly acquire meaning simply because we prefix to them the
two other words "God can." It remains true that all things are
possible with God: the intrinsic impossibilities are not things
but nonentities. It is no more possible for God than for the
weakest of His creatures to carry out both of two mutually
exclusive alternatives -- not because His power meets an
obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we
talk it about God.
... C. S. Lewis (1898-1963), The Problem of Pain
I take it that in this discussion we are talking about the Biblical God, not Homer Simpson's Jesus who "could microwave a burrito so hot that he himself could not eat it!" See http://www.simpsoncrazy.com/scripts/weekend-at-burnsies.php ]
The third kind of knowledge is God's free knowledge. This type of knowledge consists of contingent truths that are dependent upon God's will; or truths that God brings about, that He does not have to bring about. Examples might include statements like "God created the earth" or something particular about this world which God has actualized.
The second kind of knowledge is middle knowledge (or scientia media) and describes things that are contingently true, but are independent of God's will. These are truths that do not have to be true, but are true without God being the primary cause of them. "If I had taken the train instead of driving, I would not have been late for work," is an example of middle knowledge. I did not take the train, so God is not involved as a cause. The train being the better option is not a logical necessity, so it is contingent if true.
Molinists support their case with Jesus's statement in Matthew 11:23:
"And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? You will be brought down to Hades. For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day."
The Molinist claims that in this example, God will know what is contingently true and independent of God's free will, namely that the Sodomites would have responded in such a way that Sodom would still have been in existence in Jesus' day. This would be an example of a counterfactual statement.
Matthew 11:23 contains what is commonly called a counterfactual of creaturely freedom. But counterfactuals are to be distinguished from foreknowledge. The Bible contains many examples of foreknowledge or prophecy such as Deut 31:16-17 where God tells Moses that the Israelites will forsake God after they are delivered from Egypt.[1] But counterfactuals of creaturely freedom and foreknowledge are generally considered to be two separate things.[2]
Some opponents of Molinism claim that God's foreknowledge and knowledge of counterfactuals are examples of what God is going to actively bring about. That is, when Christ describes the response of the Sodomites in the aforementioned example, God was going to actively bring it about that they would remain until today.[3] Molinists have responded to this objection by noting that scripture contains examples of God's foreknowledge of evil acts. For example, the Israelites forsaking God, or Peter's denial of Christ, are both examples of what one would call overt acts of sin. Yet, according to opponents of Molinism, God is actively bringing about these overt acts of sin. This is obviously fallacious according to the Molinist. In order for this account of prophecy to be valid all prophecies must be wholly good, and never contain evil acts; but this is not the case.
A counterfactual is a statement of the form "if it were the case that P, it would be the case that Q". An example would be, "If Bob were in situation X he would freely choose A over B." The Molinist claims that even if Bob is never in situation X God could still know what Bob would do. The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all possible worlds and then actualized a particular one. God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals would play an integral part in this "choosing" of a particular world.
Molinists say the logical ordering of events for creation would be as follows:
1. God's knowledge of necessary truths.
2. God's middle knowledge, (including counterfactuals).
---Creation of the World---
3. God's free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world).
Hence, God's middle knowledge plays an important role in the actualization of the world. In fact, it seems as if God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals plays a more immediate role in creation than God's foreknowledge. The placing of God's middle knowledge between God's knowledge of necessary truths and God's creative decree is crucial. For if God's middle knowledge was after His decree of creation, then God would be actively causing what various creatures would do in various circumstances and thereby destroying libertarian freedom. But by placing middle knowledge (and thereby counterfactuals) before the creation decree God allows for freedom in the libertarian sense. The placing of middle knowledge logically after necessary truths, but before the creation decree also gives God the possibility to survey possible worlds and decide which world to actualize.[4]
Calvinists typically deny that God has "middle Knowledge," or knowledge of counterfactuals. (Unless one is a "Calvinist" like Alvin Plantinga!) Molinism allows possible worlds where human will is causal, and then this actual world-- that possible world which God wills to actually exist. It's premodern both-and thinking at its finest.
Pink rejects that there are counterfactuals and such "possible worlds:" there must either be an actual world where God's will is sovereign, or an actual world where human will is sovereign.
"To argue that God is "trying His best" to save all mankind, but that the majority of men will not let Him save them, is to insist that the will of the Creator is impotent, and that the will of the creature is omnipotent." (Pink)
This is quintessential modernist either-or thinking. To my mind, it is admirable that Pink wants to glorify God by stressing His sovereignty; but his god is a lesser being than One Whose omniscience is even greater. Or, to put it another way, which God is greater?
1) One whose knowledge includes only (a) necessary and (b) contingent truths
2) One whose knowledge includes (a) necessary, (b) contingent and (c) counterfactual truths?
Bottom line: for those of us who are Molinists, the Calvinist God is just too small! Calvinism, instead of glorifying God, diminishes his omniscience, thus causing His sovereignty to suffer as well.
(P.S. To all the postmoderns out there: notice that I am not saying that God's knowledge is LIMITED to just these truths!
"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."
But neither am I saying we must immediately punt to either a mysticism or to a social activism that gives up/forbids any discussion of providence and God's nature!)
Blessings in Christ,
Beth
4 comments:
Hey Beth, this is Nick. Just a few comments on your understanding of Molinism. First, I would assume that you would say that among the counterfactuals, God chooses to actualize the best possible world, reflecting judgment and the nature of God. If this is true, then this is the best possible of worlds, perhaps I’m too much an idealist, but I hope we are not the best humanity has to offer! But assuming this is the best possible selection to actualize, does this not imply that God must respond to the actions of humans in the counterfactuals? If so, what was first cause? If first cause is connected to our actualized world, then we would be first cause because we previously said that God responds to our actions in the counterfactuals by then actualizing one world. Or, perhaps first cause is God’s creation of counterfactuals, however, does not first cause refer to the cause of the actualized world? If all counterfactuals had a first cause would that not imply a second, third and fourth? And, if a counterfactual has a final cause, does that not imply actualization, a being or Truth? In other words, using Aristotelian casual theory, first cause must be God. But according to Molinism as I understand it, God is constantly in a state of reacting to human actions. And, as I understand first cause, first cause is uniquely related to the actualized world, yet a world is not actualized until human first acts. So how then does first cause occur by God? Can a counterfactual have the four causes? Because the answer to first cause cannot be humanity.
I think Nick raised good questions, and I hope mine have merit as well. I've always been skeptical of Molinism. Maybe it's just more counterintuitive for some people than others, but I can't grasp the sense in which God knows a possible world in such a way that it remains nonexistent vis-a-vis the way God knows our existent world. If God really knows all the details of any possible world, then he knows every possible person as thoroughly as he knows each of us actual folk. For instance, God knows not merely every action performed by each of my googols(?) of possible doppelgangers, but also every feeling, every thought, every prayer (at least among the subset of Sogns that are theists), of each possible variant of me. This means that God must know not only all possible states of all creatures, but also all possible states of himself - i.e. just as there is a virtually infinite number of possible worlds, there is also a virtually infinite number of possible Gods. Therefore, when selecting a possible world to actualize or create, God is also choosing a God to actualize. But who is this God who stands back from all possible (and thoroughly known) versions of himself in order to survey them and select which one he will be? I find this mind-boggling at the very least.
In the same vein, I wonder about the ramifications of God's knowledge of all possible versions of each person. God knows how he would feel in response to each of my countless variants; knows how he would respond to each prayer; knows what each Sogn would say to him in every possible circumstance, and knows what he would 'say' or do in response. Given the concrete nature of thoughts, feelings, prayers, and the like, it's exceedingly hard for me to grasp what it is about all my doppelgangers that distinguishes their mere possibility from my actuality. Maybe my problem is that merely possible worlds are abstract and I don't know how abstract states of affairs can be known in the same detail as concrete states of affairs. The more I focus on the details of Molinism, the more all possible worlds seem to have the same ontological status. I can't see the difference between all possible worlds being actual and all but one world being actual. It seems, the more I contemplate it, as though the implication of Molinism is that God creates all possible worlds.
I have nothing against the existence of all possible worlds, and it's looking more and more like we are indeed part of a multiverse of all possible universes, or so I gather from sporadic scientific reading. Which raises the question: Does it pose a problem for more or less traditional Christian theology if God
were to create ALL possible worlds that he putatively surveys via middle knowledge? Or even a vast number of them? Wouldn't that be a modern variation of the principle of plenitude? Did God have to create only one measly world? And if so, why the limitation?
I just realized there's a problem in the penultimate sentence of my third paragraph. I wrote, "I can't see the difference between all possible worlds being actual and all but one world being actual." I should have written "only one" instead of "all but one." Oops.
I'm not ignoring you guys..I'm just thinking...
Post a Comment