Heaven and Hell, I: the October 2005 Wheaton Philosophy Conference

Steve and I just returned from the 2005 Wheaton College Philosophy Conference. It was great to think together with Jay Wood, Steve Evans, Jon Kvanvig, Pat Manfredi, and Jerry Walls, among others.

Jerry L. Walls, professor at Asbury Seminary and fellow Notre Dame philosophy alum gave the keynote addresses. His first was on Hell, and here's a digest of what he had to say:

"The traditional doctrine of Hell has three theses:

(1) Some people will reject God's grace
(2) They will go to hell
(3) There is no escape from hell."

Walls then suggests that people have challenged each of these three theses. For example, there are are those who challenge (1) and say that in the end, no one will reject God's grace. This position has been called Universalism.

I assume that is what the writer of the web site Collin Smith referred me to must hold, as he seems to think that it is impossible to believe that if God is love, that He would reject anyone, and that anyone would reject Him. The problem here is that then we have a loving God who ultimately winds up needing to coerce people to love/accept/receive Him. On the universalist view, God cannot be Love and ultimately allow anyone not to love Him--for that would mean separation from Him, which is one way to define hell. So, despite a person's desire to continually reject God and establish her own autonomy, the loving thing for God to do would be to override that person's will and force her to accept Him.

That doesn't sound very loving to me. What kind of love is it that is coerced? Yes, the Bible says that someday "every knee will bow and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord" (Philippians 2:10) but it also says that even the demons do the that already (James 2:19), and I suspect that one day some people will do so, but still be in rebellion against Christ. The point is that love is always free, not forced. In that glorious description of love, 1 Cor. 13, nowhere do we read, "Love is coercive" or "Love knows better than the beloved and so-- if necessary-- bludgeons the beloved to love in return." Bottom line: if universalism is true, then human beings ultimately cannot have free will, because it will not be logically possible for anyone to resist God--that is, to choose against Him. Personally, I have too high a view of human freedom to go this route.

Now it is important to remember that not everyone defines "free" the same way. Here are three possible definitions:

1) Libertarianism = the position that a person is free if and only if she could have chosen to do otherwise in a situation; to act against internal and external causes that force her to do something. Thus sometimes this is position is called "contra-causal power." Heredity and/or environment may exert a strong pull on me, but I am not free unless I can choose to act against them. For example: I may have a genetic propensity for alcoholism, but I choose not to drink, thus acting against my heredity. My grandfather, father, uncle and brother may all be ministers, but I do not have to be a minister, thus acting against environment.) Personally, this is the only definition that Steve and I think makes any sense.

2) Compatibilism= (aka "having your cake and eating it too"). A person is free insofar as she is not externally compelled. However, internal causes may determine her actions. Example: if you are holding a gun to my head, to force me to become a Muslim, then I have not freely embraced Islam. But if I have been raised in Saudi Arabia, have been taught in exclusively Muslim schools, and have never heard of Jesus Christ--in short, if my mind and will are formed as Muslim, then on the Compatibilist view I have freely embraced Islam. This is the "Soft-core" Calvinist/Presbyterian definition of freedom. It allows my actions to be internally caused (determined) yet hold me morally responsible for them. Insofar as they originated from within me, they are free. Hence, "compatible-ism," a position that blends determinism and freedom. I have my cake (determinism by internal causes) and can eat it too (freedom from external causes).

3) Determinism: this is the position that denies freedom; human actions can be traced back entirely to biological or environmental causes. E.O Wilson, the sociobiologist, is a determinist, because he says that everything you do is a product of your genes. B.F. Skinner is a determinist, because he says that everything you do is a product of your environment (stimulus and response.) You cannot act against causes; you have no contra-causal power. The problem here is that it becomes impossible to establish moral responsibility, because if you couldn't do otherwise, how can you deserve blamed or praise for your action? Really hard-core Calvinists are theological determinists, because they insist that God is so sovereign, so in-control of the universe, that it is impossible for there to be any other sort of causality besides Him. Steve and I adamantly reject theological determinism.

I can't see how anyone can be a Universalist and hold a high view of human freedom (Libertarianism.) To be a Universalist you have to either be a Determinist and say that at some point God overrides those last remaining human wills that are holding out against Him and externally forces them to accept His grace; or be a Compatibilist, and say that at some point God overrides those last remaining human wills that are holding out against Him by miraculously changing them, internally, so that it is now their will to accept His grace. If you reject this sort of interference, and want to insist that human freedom means having the power to act against causes-- internal, external and even divine--then you can't be a Universalist.

Being a libertarian has distinct advantages later on if we get to talking about the Problem of Evil. (Remember David Hume's challenge? "How can an all good, all powerful God be real, and there be evil? Either He is good, but not powerful enough to stop it; or he is powerful, but malicious, in not wanting to, or evil is an illusion.Any way you go, Christians who hold that God is all good, all powerful, and that evil is not an illusion are being inconsistent.") So there is no way that I will give up a libertarian definition of freedom, for it will be the key to defusing Hume's criticism.

More later.


Here are some interesting related sites:
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/univ.htm
Keith de Rose from Yale explains why he holds universalism to be true. A very articulate guy. He adapted a lot on this site for the paper he delivered at the Wheaton Conference; but in the discussion people nailed him on his not being able to hold a strong libertarian conception of freedom.

http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2005/09/wheaton_philoso.html
Gives a schedule of the papers delivered at the Conference, and includes a conversation where two of the participants (Jon Kvanvig, Keith de Rose) respond to a question from James Gibson, who asks for books and articles where the traditional idea of hell as a place of eternal punishment is defended.